required. At a minimum, all such personnel shall have had a favorably adjudicated NAC completed within the last 5 years prior to assignment in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.65.1

(l) Education and orientation personnel. Persons selected for duties in connection with programs involving the education and orientation of military personnel shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC prior to such assignment. This does not include teachers/administrators associated with university extension courses conducted on military installations in the United States. Non-US citizens from a country listed in Appendix G shall be required to undergo a BI if they are employed in a position covered by this paragraph.

(m) Contract guards. Any person performing contract guard functions shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC prior to such assignment

(n) Transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E). Any DoD military, civilian or contract employee (including commercial carrier) operating a vehicle or providing security to a vehicle transporting Category I, II or Confidential AA&E shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC or ENTNAC.

(o) Personnel occupying information systems positions designated ADP-I, ADP-II & ADP-III. DoD military, civilian personnel, consultants, and contractor personnel performing on unclassified automated information systems may be assigned to one of three position sensitivity designations (in accordance with Appendix J) and investigated as follows:

ADP-I: BI ADP-II: DNACI/NACI ADP-III: NAC/ENTNAC

Those personnel falling in the above categories who require access to classified information will, of course, be subject to the appropriate investigative scope contained in §154.16(b).

(p) Others. Requests for approval to conduct an investigation on other personnel, not provided for in §154.18 (b) through (o) considered to fall within

§154.19 Reinvestigation.

- (a) General. DoD policy prohibits unauthorized and unnecessary investigations. There are, however, certain situations and requirements that necessitate reinvestigation of an individual who has already been investigated under the provisions of this part. It is the policy to limit reinvestigation of individuals to the scope contained in paragraph 5, Appendix A to meet overall security requirements. Reinvestigation, generally, is authorized only as follows:
- (1) To prove or disprove an allegation relating to the criteria set forth in §154.7 of this part with respect to an individual holding a security clearance or assigned to a position that requires a trustworthiness determination;
- (2) To meet the periodic reinvestigation requirements of this part with respect to those security programs enumerated below; and
- (3) Upon individual request, to assess the current eligibility of individuals who did not receive favorable adjudicative action after an initial investigation, if a potential clearance need exists and there are reasonable indications that the factors upon which the adverse determination was made no longer exists.
- (b) Allegations related to disqualification. Whenever questionable behavior patterns develop, derogatory information is discovered, or inconsistencies arise related to the disqualification criteria outlined in §154.7 that could have an adverse impact on an individual's security status, a Special Investigative Inquiry (SII), psychiatric, drug or alcohol evaluation, as appropriate, may be requested to resolve all relevant issues in doubt. If it is essential that additional relevant personal data is required from the investigative subject, and the subject fails to furnish

the general provisions of §154.18(a) shall be submitted, detailing the justification therefor, for approval to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Approval of such requests shall be contingent upon an assurance that appropriate review procedures exist and that adverse determinations will be made at no lower than major command level.

¹See footnote 1 to §154.2(c).

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the required data, the subject's existing security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties shall be terminated in accordance with §154.56(b).

(c) Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Each individual having current access to SCI shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.

(d) Critical-sensitive positions. Each DoD civilian employee occupying a critical sensitive position shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in

paragraph 5, Appendix A.

(e) Presidential support duties. Each individual assigned Presidential Support duties shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.

- (f) NATO staff. Each individual assigned to a NATO staff position requiring a COSMIC clearance shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A. Those assigned to a NATO staff position requiring a NATO SECRET clearance shall be the subject of a new NAC conducted on
- a 5-year recurring basis. (g) Extraordinarily sensitive duties. In extremely limited instances, extraordinary national security implications associated with certain SCI duties may require very special compartmentation and other special security measures. In such instances, a Component SOIC may, with the approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, request PR's at intervals of less than 5 years as outlined in paragraph 5, Appendix A. Such requests shall include full justification and a recommendation as to the desired frequency. In reviewing such requests, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall give due consideration to:
- (1) The potential damage that might result from the individual's defection or abduction.
- (2) The availability and probable effectiveness of means other than reinvestigation to evaluate factors concerning the individual's suitability for continued SCI access.
- (h) Foreign nationals employed by DoD organizations overseas. Foreign nation-

- als employed by DoD organizations overseas who have been granted a "Limited Access Authorization" pursuant to §154.16(d) shall be the subject of a PR, as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A, conducted under the auspices of DIS by the appropriate military department or other U.S. Government investigative agency consistent with §154.9(e) and Appendix I of this part.
- (i) Persons accessing very sensitive information classified Secret. (1) Heads of DoD Components shall submit a request to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for approval to conduct periodic reinvestigations on persons holding Secret clearances who are exposed to very sensitive Secret information.
- (2) Generally, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will only approve periodic reinvestigations of persons having access to Secret information if the unauthorized disclosure of the information in question could reasonably be expected to:
 - (i) Jeopardize human life or safety.
- (ii) Result in the loss of unique or uniquely productive intelligence sources or methods vital to U.S. security.
- (iii) Compromise technologies, plans, or procedures vital to the strategic advantage of the United States.
- (3) Each individual accessing very sensitive Secret information who has been designated by an authority listed in paragraph A, Appendix E as requiring periodic reinvestigation, shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as stated in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
- (j) Access to Top Secret information. Each individual having current access to Top Secret information shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as outlined in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
- (k) Personnel occupying computer positions designated ADP-1. All DoD military, civilians, consultants, and contractor personnel occupying computer positions designated ADP-I, shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.